I remain troubled by the unabashed international enthusiasm for Rwanda's "impressive progress". And the continued uncritical gaze of international actors combined with impressive amounts of moral and financial support for the reconstitution of the Rwandan state. The EU, for example, holds that Rwanda is back on track. Remember that Rwanda was the darling of the international donor community in the 1970s and 1980s. Recall also that it was, in part, international fervour for democratisation and multi-partyism that provoked the genocide. If these statements ring hollow, see for example, Straus (2005), The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in
The EU statement lists what it considers to be Rwanda's impressive gains: "National and local elections were held in 2003 and 2006 respectively. Basic human rights and fundamental freedoms are formally protected by the 2003 constitution, which also provides for institutions to monitor and protect these rights. Unity and reconciliation activities have increased with the nationwide roll-out of the Gacaca process in 2006 and the acceleration of the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Both are scheduled for completion in 2008. Rwanda's improving governance environment is reflected in its recent African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) report, endorsed by African Heads of State in 2006".
Um, ok. But we know that the 2003 and 2006 were not secret ballot, that intimidation practices were rife, campaigning was restricted, and anything amounting to disloyalty to the ruling RPF was a one-way ticket to prison. (see for example the reports of the International Crisis Group as well as the report of the Mission d’observation électorale de l’Union Européene).
Basic human rights and fundamental freedoms are protected by the 003 constitution, but access to the courts is limited to those with the ability to mount a case. The cost, as well as the fear of reprisal make a trip to the courtroom to provide those rights out of the reach of virtually all Rwandans.
New institutions, like the Ombudsman, the Rwandan Human Rights Commission and the Legal and Constitutional Commission, do exist. But virtually nothing is known about their functioning. How can we assert they are upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms without more insider knowledge. Why is the word of the Rwandan government sufficient when we know that governments are more likely to harm their citizens in times of 'peace' than in periods of crisis; democide is more prevalent phenomenon around the world than is genocide or politicide.
And on the APRM, Rwanda actually received a caution from the NEPAD secretariat, particularly on human rights, political disappearances and the lack of autonomous civil society. I tried to get a copy of Rwanda's APRM review when I was in Rwanda in 2006; I was told repeatedly that it was an internal government document. How is that for transparency and accountability, two alleged pillars of democratic societies? And Rwanda's review is endorsed by African Heads of States. Are those the same Heads of State that have, for example, left Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe to wreak havoc on his people?
The most worrying comment of the EU commissioner is the presence of ethnic unity and reconciliation through the gacaca and ICTR trials. It is well known that the Rwandan government has no time for UN justice. As for gacaca, acts of unity and reconciliation have indeed been performed but do we know anything about the actual presence of reconciliation between ordinary Rwandans?
Justice is forced upon ordinary Rwandans in the name of national unity and reconciliation. Individuals are constantly and consistently reminded of the need to reconcile to consolidate present peace and future security. The gacaca process resolves the case officially at the level of the individual while at the same time re-inforces the image of the post-genocide state as one that at least tries to treat its citizens fairly in the pursuit of national unity and reconciliation. Long after the decision has been rendered however, ordinary Rwandans are left with the everyday, lived realities of “unity” and of “reconciliation” in a social context that remains for most participants one of fear and insecurity. The security of state trumps individual processes of reconciliation.
